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Th e Signifi cance of Plato’s Notions of 
Beauty and Pleasure in the 
Philosophy of Kant
Jennifer A. McMahon
Plato conceived of the Form of Beauty as quite distinct from the Form of the Good. 
Beauty was a means to the Good. Th e ascent theory of the Symposium has suggested 
to some commentators that Plato envisaged two kinds of beauty, the sensuous and 
the intellectual, and that to reach the Good we must transcend our sensuous desires 
and cultivate an appreciation of intellectual beauty. However, in the Laws Plato 
presents us with a third notion of beauty, which is neither sensuous nor intellectual. 
To experience beauty we need to cultivate our pleasure in harmonious forms. Th is 
is where we fi nd a theory of beauty that resonates in Kant’s aesthetic theory. Accord-
ing to the latter, the feeling for beauty is a feeling for harmony that takes us beyond 
the confi nes of a world marked out by self-interest. I conclude that Plato’s aesthetic 
theory anticipates the role that aesthetic judgment would play in Immanuel Kant’s 
system of the mind.
I. Introduction
According to one interpretation of Plato’s aesthetic theory, beauty directs us away 
from conceiving of ourselves as essentially sensuous beings (appetite). Th is inter-
pretation is based on the ascent theory drawn from the Symposium according to 
which there is a lower beauty borne of sensual gratifi cation and a higher beauty 
marked by intellectual pleasure. However, there is an alternative interpretation of 
Plato’s aesthetic theory that draws upon his notion of beauty in the Laws. Th is 
notion of beauty shows that the dilemma between sensual and intellectual beauty 
is a false one. Th ere is a feeling for beauty that is neither sensual nor intellectual, 
which Plato urges us to cultivate because it directs us towards the good.
Th e argument that the dilemma between sensuous and intellectual beauty is 
false is cemented by Kant in his Critique of Judgment. Kant argues that the culti-
vation of the feeling for the beautiful in nature trains us to think of ourselves as 
moral agents. Th e cultivation of our feeling for beauty was for both Plato and Kant, 
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the cultivation of the feeling required for living in harmony within a community. 
In this respect Plato’s notion of beauty anticipates the role that aesthetic judgment 
plays in Immanuel Kant’s system of the mind (Kant, 1987 [1790]). Conversely, in 
the light of Kant’s aesthetic theory, I believe we can more fully appreciate what 
Plato had in mind regarding the mimesis of form.
II. A Hierarchy of Beauty
According to Plato, beauty had various manifestations in an ascending hierarchy 
from the beauty of the body, to moral beauty, to the beauty of human institutions 
and artefacts, to the beauty of knowledge and fi nally to some kind of access to 
the abstract entity of the Form of Beauty (Th e Symposium & Phaedrus). In order 
to ascend though this hierarchy one needed to cultivate one’s response to beauty 
at each level, moving from the particular to the general. For example, we love the 
beauty of the individual until eventually we come to apprehend beauty as a charac-
teristic of all bodies. Th e apprehension of the beauty of such an abstraction paves 
the way for perceiving the form of beauty in abstract entities associated with the 
person such as behaviour and personality. Moving from the individual to the gen-
eral, we perceive beauty in the idea of morality, and from here we eventually see 
beauty in the way the relevant personality traits are manifested in human institu-
tions and artefacts. Abstracting from this realisation we apprehend that the striving 
for order and harmony, which is the defi ning mark of the institution, is a mani-
festation of the human capacity that Plato understands as our capacity for beauty 
(which in Plato has a divine source). Finally we perceive the beauty of knowledge 
in the particular and then the general; knowledge as the key which converts the 
random and meaningless into order and meaning. From this manifestation of 
beauty we are close to discarding the contingent and transitory, and apprehending 
the Form of Beauty.
III. Th e Mimesis of Form
“Th e Forms” as in the Form of beauty are distinct from the idea of form in the con-
tent and form divide as it applies to art. “Th e Forms” are entities that exist for Plato 
in a supersensory sense, not subject to time or space. Th ey represent a distillation 
of all experience and thought into its most essential elements. Plato also makes use 
of the term “form” in its more usual sense when analysing poetry and music, and 
this is the sense in which we are interested.
Plato raised the issue of what kind of knowledge is acquired through art which is 
a question still asked today. He suggested that one can acquire knowledge through 
both content and form. Plato assumed that art could infl uence behaviour through 
its content (the idea being that we can learn from artistic representations). It is oft en 
as sumed that Plato focused on the propositional content of art alone (Th e Republic). 
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However, in Th e Laws he argues that the form 
of art also infl uences behaviour.
Plato diff erentiated between form and 
con tent in his concept of mimesis. Of inter-
est here is that he argued that the form of art 
could train us through its representations of 
rhythms and harmonies to direct our desire 
for pleasure towards the good. With this no-
tion, the centuries between Plato and Kant 
dissolve. Kant can be understood to identify 
the kinds of mental capacities one would 
need in order to fi nd pleasure in such harmo-
nies. Kant was interested in this capacity as he 
believed that it played a role in alerting one to 
one’s moral vocation. In this respect, Plato’s 
conception of beauty is alive and well in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment. In Th e Laws Plato distin-
guishes between two kinds of mimesis — one concerned with content and the other 
with form. Th is distinction and particularly the higher status he attributes to form 
anticipate Kantian aesthetics. 
Mimesis in relation to content is the more common notion of mimesis attrib-
uted to Plato. Th is is the notion that he associates with appearances. While appear-
ances are once removed from objects of knowledge, artworks are at least twice 
removed from objects of knowledge, as they are copies of mere appearances. Th e 
raising of mere appearances to an object of contemplation is to be avoided because 
appearances distract us from knowledge of the Forms and it is only through the 
latter (which we apprehend in part through the apprehension of beauty) that we 
can ascend to the Good (be our best selves and fi nd happiness). Consequently in 
book ten of Th e Republic, Plato bans art from the Ideal Republic on the basis that 
art distracts us from our ascent to the Form of the Good.
Mimesis in relation to form, on the other hand, concerns the harmony, balance 
and rhythms of music (Schipper, 1963:199–202). Rightness in mimesis of form 
does not refer to an accurate copy of visual objects or sounds but refers instead 
to representing harmonies of form. In Th e Laws, Plato implies that when these 
rhythms imitate the Form of Beauty, they have as their subject more than mere 
appearances (Th e Laws 653e–665e). If the young cultivate their response of pleas-
ure to such forms, they will be drawn to the good.
IV. Disinterested Pleasure
Th e crux to understanding the diff erence between kinds of beauty, is to understand 
the diff erence in our orientation to the object required of each kind. Kant in his 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).
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Critique of Judgment diff erentiates between three kinds of pleasure: pleasure in the 
sensuous (the agreeable); pleasure in content (measured against a set of criteria or 
a matter of anticipated personal benefi t); and the disinterested pleasure of beauty. 
Th e pleasure in the sensuous is the satisfaction of desires and physical needs. Th is 
is the province of the emotions, the charming and the personal, where agreeable 
pleasure is concerned. Moving onto the second kind of pleasure, pleasure in con-
tent or concept could be the pleasure in discovery for its own sake, an intellectual 
pleasure oft en confused with the disinterested pleasure of beauty. However, intel-
lectual pleasure is distinct from that of beauty. It involves a build up of tension 
while a solution is still forthcoming and then a release of tension when the solution 
is found which accounts for the pleasure. Most other kinds of conceptual pleasure 
involve measuring an object against a set of criteria. Good design is like this where 
we judge an object to be good based on the fi t between its design and its function. 
In fact Kant refers to conceptual pleasure as pleasure in the good. Th e good is 
always good for something and hence always involves an interest through cogni-
tion (see Savile, 1987:136–40).
Pleasure in beauty is distinct from these kinds of pleasure and demands a dis-
tinct orientation towards the object. Kant explains the grounds for this orientation 
according to his system of the mind. Bear in mind that Kant recognised that what 
we perceive is in part a function of the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms of the 
human mind. Th ere are limitations on what we can know and these limitations can 
only be understood if we consider the kind of knowledge of which we are capable. 
Regarding our experience of beauty, Kant identifi ed the features of the associated 
experience and then set about reasoning what would need to be the conditions 
of the mind in order for such an experience to be possible. As Kant’s notion of 
beauty is neither sensuous nor intellectual, he grounds the experience of beauty in 
what to our contemporary minds we can understand as the exploitation of certain 
perceptual principles. Certain objects, in the course of perception, deploy percep-
tual principles in such a way, that either in economising their normal function or 
perhaps deploying them in unprecedented ways, draw our attention to an aspect 
of perception itself. We are not aware of the source of the experience. Instead we 
attribute the experience to something about the object.
Kant explains in his Critique of Pure Reason that all cognition is pleasurable, as 
is all perception. Th is is because for Kant, perception is an achievement rather than 
a given (Savile, 1987:136). What we perceive is constructed from certain primitives 
given in perception. We might think of this in terms of the retina simply picking 
up variations in light intensities and from this information perceiving edges and 
boundaries, and through operations like stereopsis, constructing forms that the 
higher cognitive system can recognise. One way of thinking about this is that the 
system settles on the right representation (or concept) when harmony is achieved. 
Th is is a harmony between the representation and the knowledge already present 
in the cognitive system. We know harmony is achieved through the pleasure 
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aff orded by the fi t between the newly constructed representation and existing 
knowledge. In most cases this is a very slight pleasure that we would hardly notice. 
However in the case of perceiving certain objects, particularly certain natural 
scenes and objects, the pleasure is heightened because instead of the process being 
closed off  when a concept is found, no concept is found but a harmony is achieved 
nonetheless. Th e harmony felt is not a harmony between incoming data and our 
established body of knowledge, but a harmony between the processes involved in 
perception and cognition. At least this is how we might express it in contemporary 
terms while still remaining true to the spirit of Kant.
Corresponding to the three kinds of pleasure identifi ed by Kant might be what 
in Plato are sensuous beauty, intellectual beauty and the beauty of form respectively. 
Looking back at Diotima’s explanation of the development of beauty appreciation 
in Plato’s Symposium with the hindsight provided by Plato’s Laws, the cultivation of 
beauty appreciation is not so much an ascent as a matter of fi nely tuning the focus 
when looking through a telescope.1 Th e coarse grained images are visible even when 
the telescope is out of focus. Th is is akin to our appreciation of sensuous beauty. Intel-
lectual beauty requires some fi ne-tuning. But it is only once we have become familiar 
with sensuous and intellectual beauty that we notice the telescope is still out of focus. 
Learning to focus on harmonious forms brings us beyond both the sensuous and 
the intellectual because it involves an appreciation of the way forms in nature (and 
possibly replicated in human artefacts like music) are perfectly attuned to our per-
ceptual apparatus which leaves us feeling integrated into the natural world.
Th is kind of beauty inspires a feeling response that is poorly served by the ap-
pellation “pleasure”. Plato called our response to this kind of beauty “love” because he 
thought the concept of pleasure represented too transient and subjective a response 
to capture the lasting eff ect of beauty. His recognition of the peculiar feel-good but 
transformative rather than transient nature of our response to beauty, anticipated 
the use by Kant of the term “disinterested” in relation to the relevant pleasure (aft er 
the Th ird Earl of Shaft esbury in the early 18th century [Stolnitz, 1961]).
A question that might come to mind at this point is why be drawn through these 
manifestations of beauty? If pleasure is evoked by each kind of beauty, what makes 
the pleasure evoked by one form of beauty, say the less focused sensuous beauty, 
less satisfying than the pleasure evoked by another form, say the fi nely tuned for-
mal kind? One way to answer this would be to draw upon the Stoic notion of virtue 
and happiness. Th e more fi nely tuned the experience of beauty, the less reliant one 
is upon external rewards and satisfactions and hence the less anxiety that is attend-
ant upon it. Th e less we rely upon those events over which we have little control, 
the more that long lasting happiness will be ours, according to the Stoicism which 
derives from Plato in Seneca, Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus.
1 This metaphor is borrowed from James Kirwan (1999) Beauty. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. I develop it from its original form.
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Plato’s analysis of pleasure in the Philebus is analogous to his hierarchy of beau-
ties as expressed in the Symposium. Th e lower pleasures are a mixture of pleas-
ure and pain. Th ey result from alleviating pain, ceasing deprivation or satisfying 
desires. Th ey are never pure pleasures because not only do they depend upon a 
former lack of some kind, but at the moment of satiation, another need begins to 
build in its place. To base one’s search for happiness on such pleasures is to be at the 
mercy of a constant yearning. Th is kind of pleasure was not perceived by Plato as 
capturing our response to beauty. Such pleasures were too transient and subjective. 
On the other hand, he recognised a pure and true pleasure that was not the result 
of fate, fortune or any other kind of contingency. Th is was the pleasure in formal 
patterns which encompassed not only the forms in certain kinds of musical styles 
but also the contemplation of the higher Forms, and he named this kind of pleasure 
in the case of beauty, love. 
Th e eighteenth-century philosophers recognised this peculiar characteristic of 
our response to beauty when they settled for the term “disinterested pleasure” to 
denote the response to beauty. Disinterest is not a matter of lack of interest. It sim-
ply means that the object of beauty does not cause pleasure in virtue of satisfying 
certain personal interests. Disinterested pleasure is a pleasure unconnected with 
desire. Th is is a key point in understanding Plato’s distinction between Beauty and 
the Good (which we do desire). We desire what is good, but only fi nd it through 
partaking in beauty, the apprehension of which, desire impedes. So we would reach 
what is good by overcoming the desire we have for it.
Kant’s aesthetic theory is consistent with the notion that desire obstructs the 
apprehension of beauty but not by stipulation, but rather by a priori necessity. To 
desire is to conceive of the object (of desire) according to one’s interests. One might 
fi nd one and the same physical object to be both desirous and beautiful but not 
under the same representation. As an object of beauty it is not subsumed under a 
concept. As an object of desire it is necessarily subsumed under a concept related 
to our interests.
Kant provides the grounds for the feeling of beauty (a disinterested pleasure) 
in a harmony felt between faculties of the mind when confronted with beautiful 
objects. Th at is, certain objects have a constitution which when apprehended are 
experienced as perfectly attuned to the cognitive faculties, and this is experienced 
as pleasurable. Th e constitution of the relevant objects is such that when perceiving 
them, instead of simply subsuming perceptual data under a concept, which is the 
normal activity at the interface of perception and cognition, we are thrown back 
into a reverie on the object of perception. Th is is experienced as an intense focus 
on the particulars of the object. Th is in turn converts to refl ection on general ideas 
associated with our integration into nature, which accounts for the lasting eff ect of 
experiences of beauty. According to Kant, such experiences prevent us from feeling 
alienated from nature. We are left  feeling a part of something greater than the world 
as marked out by our own interests. Th is feeling, in turn, furthers our integration 
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into society, furthering culture. Th e experience of beauty leads us to a sense of self 
as a moral agent. Th e implication in Kant is that pleasure in the beautiful forms of 
nature should be cultivated in the young for the benefi t of society. Th is is suffi  cient 
to make the link with Plato’s aesthetic theory obvious.
Conclusion
According to Kant, the pleasure in beauty is the pleasure we experience in the 
purposiveness of our minds; and this we are alerted to through the perception of 
certain objects whose constitution is perfectly suited to the operations inherent in 
the process of perception at a sub personal level. Th e perception of such objects 
prompts an experience of the harmony that unbeknownst to us ensues between the 
aspect of the mind responsible for ordering the incoming data and the concepts 
or categories necessary for the cognitive activities of reason. Th is purposiveness is 
an aspect of our moral selves. Th at is, Kant’s concept of the human being is not of 
a higher animal but of a higher being with an important and signifi cant vocation, 
which he refers to as our moral vocation. His conception of beauty is of a feeling 
response to evidence of our purposiveness refl ected in our perception of nature 
and some human artefacts. Our response to beauty draws us away from a concep-
tion of ourselves as solely sensuous beings in a sensuous world, towards a realisa-
tion of our selves as moral agents. As such, one can apprehend the echoes of Plato 
in the role Kant hoped to fi ll with beauty.
It can be argued that Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics incorporate aspects 
of empiricism and rationalism. He postulated a concept of a mind independent 
reality to which we nonetheless have access through what he called a supersensi-
ble substrate of humanity. However, he argued that anything known through the 
senses is only knowledge of the phenomenal, rather than knowledge of the thing-
in-itself. Aesthetic judgment was symptomatic of these characteristics of mind, 
because beauty was the experience we had when the mind was alerted to some-
thing through the senses to which the normal channels for constructing knowl-
edge of the empirical were inadequate. Here are echoes of Plato once again in the 
distinction between appearance and reality; and the disruption of their normal 
relationship in mind through the experience of beauty.
Kant constructs a map of the mind that would explain what is going on when 
we experience beauty that links the sensory with the supersensible. In this way he 
tries to show that it is through aesthetic judgment that our sensuous and rational 
selves are unifi ed. Th e most important consequence of this bringing together of 
the sensuous and the rational is that through this we are meant to be alerted to 
our moral vocation. Whether Kant succeeds in this is another matter but what his 
attempts do show is that Plato’s attempt to link a formal kind of beauty with the 
attaining of the good is repeated in Kant through the link between aesthetic judg-
ment and our moral vocation. Conversely by studying Plato’s aesthetics in the light 
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of Kant’s aesthetic theory, we can better understand that for the mature Plato, the 
way to the good was not a simple ascent charged by self denial, but an ascent borne 
on the love for beautiful forms.
According to the aesthetic theories of both the mature Plato and Kant, cultivat-
ing pleasure in beautiful forms is the cultivation of a feeling that takes us beyond 
self interest. Th is is explained by Kant as that the beauty of nature causes us to feel 
integrated with nature which in turn translates into a feeling of community. In this 
sense the feeling for beauty is a feeling for the furthering of culture, which echoes 
Plato’s notion of beauty derived from the Laws.
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